[presented by] = [[josh kevin eli] * [fronklin] + [ion weinstock]]

Disclaimer

This work does not represent the opinions of our various employers. This is personal work; done on personal time. It is party agnostic.





Agenda

- History
- Methodology
- Election Infrastructure
- Campaign Results
- State Results
- Vendor Results
- Recommendations
- Conclusions



ELI FRANKLIN





JOSH FRANKLIN







What is ElectionBuster?

- A python application, software suite, and project
- Everything we do is to protect US elections
- Our scope is large:
 - Candidates, election officials, voting system manufacturers, voting services providers
- Started with finding fake presidential sites, now:
 - Assessing campaign infrastructure
 - Assessing online state and local infrastructure
 - Identifying fake sites for candidates, PACs, and states



Project History

- Humble beginning as a 2012 GMU graduate project
- Initially a manual process to find fake domains
- Initially a single program, now a suite
- Shoutout to Robert Tarlecki and Matt Jablonski for their excellent teamwork for Shmoocon 2014 [7]
- Presented an update on the 2014 and early 2016 election findings at BsidesDC 2015 [10]

Focus on measurable impact for 2018



Project Methodology

- 1. Obtain names of candidates
- 2. Gather lists of candidate and state election websites
- 3. Process candidate names and websites with ElectionBuster and other assessment tools *Note: See [11] for the grading scale and rubric*
- 4. Perform manual and automated data analysis
- 5. Disclose results to affected parties in a responsible manner
- 6. Party like rockstars





What Systems Are Out There?

- Controlled by election officials (examples)
 - Voting equipment (e.g., Opscan, DREs, BMDs)
 - Electronic pollbooks
 - State election websites (e.g., SoS, SBoE)
 - Voter registration systems with online interfaces
- Under candidate and party control
 - Candidate & party websites
 - Candidate & party voter information DBs
- Other control: PACs, Non-profits





2016 Election Attacks

- Phishing of campaigns, voting service providers, and election officials [2]
- Typosquatting on campaign fundraising sites and party contractor-controlled domains [6]
- Social media manipulation & (mis|dis)information [5]
- Data breaches of federal, state, & local systems [8]
 - Also candidate and campaign systems [9]
- Direct attacks on online voter registration systems and campaign infrastructure [4]



Campaigns 101

- There are 1000s of candidates running in this November's election
 - We've scanned most of them
- Most campaigns are very small operations, with little to no IT expertise
- Larger campaigns have sophisticated IT infrastructure
- We observed campaigns being run purely from Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and Snapchat

 This might be the future...cheap and secure



2012 Findings

- Basically guessing for typosquats
- Manual data analysis
- Found very interesting typosquats
- Fake DNC and RNC site accepting donations
- Infected political action committee (PAC) sites
- Presented results at Shmoocon 2014 [7]

Our Country Deserves Better PAC

www.ourcountrydeservesbetter.com/

This site may be compromised.

Buy Viagra online from an official certified pharmacy, OVERNIGHT Shipping, Exclusive & competitive discount prices, express shipping & discrete packaging.



6.37



2014 Findings

- First iteration of ElectionBuster
- Found NRCC sites that could potentially confuse voters into donating to the wrong candidate
- Several candidate sites were actively distributing malware
- Sensitive WHOIS information
- Highlighted need to focus on data analysis







KIRKPATRICK FOR CONGRESS

A career politician and insider, Kirkpatrick was booted out of Congress by Arizonans in 2010 after she sided with Nancy Pelosi and supported ObamaCare. But in 2012, she managed to return after Pelosi's allies came to her rescue with millions of dollars.

That probably explains why Kirkpatrick continues to be in in Pelosi's back pocket.

Kirkpatrick is a huge embarrassment to Arizona. How?

- Kirkpatrick walked out on her own town hall because she didn't want to answer questions about voting for ObamaCare.
- After she lost the election, Kirkpatrick brought campaign staffers on the official House payroll then spent over \$100,000 in taxpayer funds on salaries and bonuses for just two days of work.
- Kirkpatrick voted to keep the Grand Canyon shut down so she could protect
 ObamaCare.
- Kirkpatrick isn't just liberal she doesn't even do her job as a representative. She missed 16 votes in just her first few days back in Congress.

DONATE

www.annkirkpatrick.com



NEWS

ISSUES

BIO

f y Q

DONATE

OBAMACARE IS BAD MEDICINE

CONTACT

LET'S SEND A DOCTOR TO THE SENATE.

Email

ACT

I'M IN

www.gingrey.com



2016 Hillary Clinton Typosquats







2016 Donald Trump Typosquats





www.ted2016.org

www.donaldjtrump.comww.teamhillary.com

ww.jeb4president.com Day of scans: E-Day 2016

www.trump2016.com

R igraph

www.votetrump.com www.presidenttedcruz.org





Success...and Failure

- We released PACScan in 2015
- Pointed it at ActBlue, one of the main fundraising platforms used by Democrats
- Recent indictments show that DNC and DCCC sites were hacked to redirect to a fake ActBlue page:
 - actblues(dot)com
- Although we detected it, we did not flag it as malicious even after investigating



May 31, 2016, YERMAKOV searched for open-source information

ny 1 and its reporting on X-Agent and X-Tunnel. On or about June

onspirators attempted to delete traces of their presence on the DCCC

the computer program CCleaner.

une 14, 2016, the Conspirators registered the domain actblues.com,

ked the domain of a political fundraising platform that included a

ons page. Shortly thereafter, the Conspirators used stolen DCCC

modify the DCCC website and redirect visitors to actblues

http://www.actblue.com http://www.catblue.net http://www.artblue.us http://www.aceblue.com http://www.antblue.com http://www.actblue.org http://www.catblue.com http://www.ictblue.com http://www.acthlug.pot nttp://www.actblues.com http://www.artblue.info http://www.aceblue.biz http://www.agtblue.com

ElectionBuster 2018 Updates

- Rewritten for Python3
- New variants and templates for PACs, election websites, and manufacturers
- Correlating ElectionBuster data with open source threat intelligence
- Began checking for homographic attacks via EvilURL and DNStwist



A Curious Case: Linda Coleman

- Candidate for State office in North Carolina
 Onder our radar
- Previously ran for Lt. Governor, this domain was purchased and repurposed [3]
- Code stripped from Wayback Machine to create a pharmaceutical storefront
- Ivan Gusev did not redact WHOIS information
- Assumed fake name, not politically motivated

Note that this was not originally identified by us; we independently investigated.



DONATE

LINDA COLEMAN LT. GOVERNOR



IT'S TIME FOR A DIFFERENT APPROACH IN RALEIGH.

I'm running for Lieutenant Governor because I want to give North Carolina's middle class families a fighting chance again. The Republican majority running things in Raleigh continues to unravel so much of what built our great state. It's time for a different approach. I know, working together, we can achieve this and more. Join me today by signing up below. Acheter dells has cher en

pharmacie

Linda Coleman

www.lindafornc.com

WHOIS lindafornc.com

	Registrant	*******	
1	Registrant Org	Private person	
(Registrant Country	RU	
	Registrat	GoDaddy.com, LLC	
		URL: http://www.godaddy.com	
		Whois Server: whois.godaddy.com	
		abuse@godaddy.com	
		(p) 14806242505	
	Registrar Status	ok	
	Dates	1,136 days old	1
		Created on 2015-01-30	
		Expires on 2019-01-30	
		Updated on 2018-01-31	
	Name Server(s)	NS1.DEALCOUPONSHOP.COM (has 16 domains) NS2.DEALCOUPONSHOP.COM (has 16 domains)	t
	Tech Contact	*******	
		Private person	
	A	Myasnitskaya, 15,	
		Moscow, Moscow obl, 119313, RU	
	IP Address	208.89.215.19 - 23 other sites hosted on this server	~
	IP Location	💽 - Washington - Seattle - Virpus	
	ASN	AS23033 WOW - Wowrack.com, US (registered Jan 07, 2002)	
	Domain Status	Registered And Active Website	
	Whois History	12 records have been archived since 2015-01-30	~
	IP History	5 changes on 6 unique IP addresses over 3 years	~
	Registrar History	1 registrar	1



www.vowepevepetastauhatstcongress.info

www.petestauberforcongress.org

www.petestauber.com www.stauberforcongress.info

www.vote4petestauber.net

www.stauber4congress.com

www.pete4congress.net

www.stauberforcongress.org

www.pete4congress.info

www.voteforpetestauber.net

www.voteforpetestauber.org

www.vote4petestauber.com

petestauberforcongress.com

www.stauber4congress.tauherforcongress.com

www.vote4petestauber.nfo

www.stauber4congress.net www.stauberforcongress.net www.stauberforcongress.com

www.petestauber.org

www.votepetestauber.net

28

www.vote4petestauber.org

www.pete4congress.org



electdevinnunes.com

C

▲ ELECT COMRADE DEVIN NUNES

избранный товарищ Дьявол Нунес

www.electdevinnunes.com

0 :



Who we are & what we do WWW.gillibrandsucks.com

Ξ

ð 0

CARLY

C

Join Carly, as we continue the fight to elect conservatives, reform Washington, and restore a citizen government to our great nation.

Meet Carly >

www.carlyfiorina.com



Cheap Non Owners Car Insurance here Non Owners Car Insurance Auto

Executive Officer Debra Moreno

Read More

Click here to download Carly's economic growth plan.

no deposit bonus

Read More

REGISTER TO VOTE Add Facebook Application

www.carlyforca.com

You

Congressional Site Statistics

- The following stats include everyone running for the Senate that we could identify
- All House incumbents are included in these stats
 - Races we deemed important were also included
 - Too many candidates to include
 - Skewing towards incumbents likely alters stats
- A majority of the scans were taken during June 2018
- Relied on Ballotpedia for pulling candidates



Congressional Site Grades



Congressional TLS Implementations



Let's Look to the States!

- States / local jurisdictions host election sites
- Election sites provide info, report results, and register voters
- Sites may be hosted by SoS, State Board of Elections (SBoE), or 3rd party org (e.g., CloudIfare, Google)
- Overwhelming majority use a .gov TLD
 - Others use a .us or .org TLD
- About half of the VR systems move from .gov to .us or .org


skip to content | skip to navigation





Español

Home	Secretary Husted & the Office	Elections & Voting	Campaign Finance	Legislation & Ballot Issues	Businesses	Notary
			Media			

REGISTER TO VOTE OR UPDATE YOUR VOTER REGISTRATION INFORMATION

American Samoa

- Unincorporated United States Territory
- Runs separate .gov and .org sites
 Not the only state organization to do this
- Site infected via a Drupal vulnerability
- Contacted for remediation
- Responsible authorities were advised
- Often to view the infected site, you need to approach from an IP outside the US
- 1 man IT operation







CONTACT INFO

Office: 1-684-699-3570 1-684-699-3571

Fax: 1-684-699-3574

MAILING ADDRESS:

P.O. BOX 3970 PAGO PAGO, AMERICAN SAMOA 96799

EMAIL:

TALOFA AND WELCOME TO THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE ELECTION OFFICE FO OF AMERICAN SAMOA!

This website is part of the Election Office's efforts to make the election process even more accessible by the public. candidates, nomination process, filing of candidacy, campaign contributions and spending requirements, qualification electors, registration requirements, and voting by absentee ballots are some of the major topics addressed on this s candidates and electors are also available on this site.

Read more

VOTER SEARCH

www.americansamoaelectionoffice.org 39

Coverage From Leaked NSA Memo

The nonexistent email accounts were called

"requestabsentee@americansamoaelectionoffice.org" and "rquestabsentee@americansamoaelectionoffice.org." The analyst believes they did this to create the email accounts—although this is something they could have done directly by just registering the accounts. [19]

requestabsentee(at)americansamoaelectionoffice(dot)org

Although strange, we believe this to be coincidental.

Voter Registration Site Grades



Voter Registration HSTS Use





Voter Registration Vulnerabilities





Election Site Grades



Election Site Vulnerabilities



Vendor Site Statistics

- Election vendors have websites too!
- There are different types of vendors
- The following stats include:
 - Voting system manufacturers
 - Voting system resellers
 - Voter registration vendors
 - Voting service providers





Recommendations to Campaigns

- Beware what you click
- Two factor authentication even personal accounts
- Purchase common election domains, before someone else does list in the appendix
- Please use a trusted digital certificate
- Use TLS 1.2+, strong cipher suites with HSTS
- Incumbents should consider EV certs
- Work with ISPs and FBI for domain takedowns
- Run security assessment tools on your own domain



Recommendations to States

- Two factor auth for all critical systems
- Purchase common domains (Register+state.com)
- Maintain a trusted certificate, consider EV cert
- Use TLS 1.2+, strong ciphers / algorithms
- Get on the HSTS pre-load list
- EI-ISAC / DHS can help with intel & remediation
- Run open source tools on your own domain
- Obtain outside assessments vet providers
- Make it easy to contact you: security@yourstate.gov



The Aftermath

- 0 sites with SSL, 0 homographs, a lot of HTTP
- 2 VR systems with a grade of F, 1 with a grade of C
- Contacted campaigns and vendors using untrusted certificates and insecure protocols
- Contacted all, and worked with some, states affected by:
 - Likely typosquats / suspicious domains
 - Insecure, or no, TLS implementations
 - Untrusted certificates, known vulnerabilities
 - Malware actively on their site



Thoughts on US Security Posture

- The situation is improving, yet there's still common sense ways to improve security
- States are getting some monetary assistance from Congress
- The community is responding:
 - Center for Internet Security released an election focused cybersecurity handbook [16]
 - Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) & Center for Technology and Civic Life (CTCL) are working to teach election officials cybersecurity basics [18]
 - Defending Digital Democracy effort focused on campaign security [15]



Conclusions

- We need to continue defending our elections
- More needs to be done, at larger scale faster
- We assessed the bare minimum of web security
- It's difficult to advise officials on security problems
- Responsible disclosure is SO MUCH work
- If you don't vote, you're helping the attackers
- Much of this can be done by ordinary citizens
- Wanna help? You need to learn: Work the polls



For a copy of the slides and data, visit:

pleasego.vote

Josh: @thejoshpit Ian: @heuristicmystic https://github.com/thorshand/electionBuster

Appendix

References

[1] Illinois Primary Election Results, New York Times, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/20/us/elections/results-illinois-primary-elections.html

[2] Threat Group-4127 Targets Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 2016 https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign

[3] Russian Meddling in North Carolina Politics, or Cialis Spam? https://www.bellingcat.com/news/americas/2018/03/12/russian-meddling-north-carolina-politics-cialis-spam/

[4] Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee, Crowdstrike, 2016. https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/

[5] "Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections" U.S. Intelligence Community Assessment, January 6, 2017 https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA 2017 01.pdf

[6] READ: Mueller indicts 12 Russians in 2016 DNC hacking, CNN, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/13/politics/read-mueller-indictment-dnc-hacking/index.html

[7] Franklin, Jablonski, Tarlecki, Malicious Online Activities in the 2012 U.S. General Election, George Mason University, Shmoocon 2014.

[8] DEFCON 2017 Voting Hacking Village Report https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-25/DEF%20CON%2025%20voting%20village%20report.pdf

[9] O'Sullivan, Dan, The RNC Files: Inside the Largest US Voter Data Leak, Upgaurd, 2018. https://www.upguard.com/breaches/the-rnc-files

[10]Franklin, Franklin, Defending Election Campaigns from Cyberspace, Bsides DC, 2015. https://jfranklin.me/prez/ElectionCybercrime-BsidesDC2015.pdf

[11] SSL Labs Rating Guide https://github.com/ssllabs/research/wiki/SSL-Server-Rating-Guide [12] Berkowitz, Karen, Russian hacking of Illinois voter registration system did not compromise election results, experts say, Chicago Tribune, 2017.

http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/highland-park/news/ct-hpn-election-integrity-forum-tl-1102-20171031-story.html

[13] "Info on 1.8M Chicago Voters was Publicly Accessible, but Now Removed from Cloud Service," Chicago Tribune, Kim Geiger, August 17, 2017:

http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-chicago-voter-data-cloud-met-0818-20170817-story.html

[14] "Russian-Speaking Hacker Selling Access to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission," Recorded Future, Andrei Barysevich, December 1, 2016: https://www.recordedfuture.com/rasputin-eac-breach/

[15] Defending Digital Democracy, Harvard Belfer Center, 2018. https://www.belfercenter.org/project/defending-digital-democracy

[16] A Handbook for Elections Infrastructure Security, Center for Internet Security, 2018. https://www.cisecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/CIS-Elections-eBook-15-Feb.pdf

[17] Leaked NSA Spearphishing Memo, National Security Agency. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3766950-NSA-Report-on-Russia-Spearphishing.html#document CDT

[18] Center for Technology and Civic Life, Save the Dates: Cybersecurity Online Training Series for Election Officials, April 2018. https://www.techandciviclife.org/news/2018/4/10/cybersecurity

[19] Leaked NSA Report Does Not Prove Russian Hacking of Voting Machine Company, June 7, 2017 https://www.theepochtimes.com/leaked-nsa-report-does-not-prove-russian-hacking-of-voting-machine-company_2 255283.html

[20] Zetter, Kim, Will the Georgia Special Election Get Hacked?, Politico, June 14, 2017. https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/06/14/will-the-georgia-special-election-get-hacked-215255





 $\overline{\mathbf{O}}$

Special Thanks To Tony Adams



- Cybersecurity expertise
- Elections expertise
- Sounding board for the entire talk



Common Templates

- Lname + Fname :: http://www.barackobama.com
- Lname + '-' + Fname :: http://www.chris-christie.com
- Fname + year :: http://lepage2014.com
- Fname + Lname + year :: http://johnwalsh2014.com
- Fname + 'for' + state :: http://alisonforkentucky.com
- Fname + Lname + 'for' + state :: http://www.edfitzgeraldforohio.com
- Lname + '4' + state :: http://www.heck4nevada.com
- Fname + 'for' + position :: https://bryansmithforcongress.com
- Position + Fname + Lname :: http://www.congressmanbillyoung.com
- 'team' + Fname :: http://www.teammitch.com
- 'vote' + fName :: http://www.voteal.com
- 'elect' + fName + Lname :: http://www.electfrench.com
- 'team' + 'fName :: http://www.teammitch.com
- 'friendsof' + fName ::https://www.friendsofamata.com
- IName + 'for' +stateAbbreviation :: http://feinsteinforca.com



CamPAINS

- Attacks started as early as 2015
- 100s of bit.ly and other links emailed to DNC / Clinton officials [2]
 o dnc.org, hillaryclinton.com
- Use of fake gmail splash pages
- Lead to access of emails, chats and GDrive
- Information distributed to other organizations (e.g., Wikileaks)

Google

1

One account. All of Google.

Sign in with your Google Account



Create an account

One Google Account for everything Google





Phishing Vendors & Officials

- Phishing emails sent to US voting system service vendors and over 100 election officials [17]
- Masqueraded as a voting technology vendor and a fake cybersecurity company
- Emails contained a Word document with a malicious payload
- The addresses used contained gmail domains such as vrsystems(at)gmail(dot)com



Voter Registration Systems

- In 2016, DHS notified 21 states of potential attacks on their online voter registration systems [12]
- Many states denied they were even scanned
- Illinois confirmed a breach
- Beginning of a better partnership between states and federal government regarding threat intelligence sharing

Alabama Alaska Arizono Colifornia Colorado Connecticut Delowore Florido Illinois lowo Maryland Minnesoto Ohio Oklahoma Oregon North Dakota Pennsylvania Texos Virginia Washington Wisconsin

1

Data Breaches

- Local: 650k voter records left on a CF card [8]
- State: Illinois VR system breached [12] as well as the Georgia KSU Center for Election Systems [20]
- Federal: Vendor information stored on US EAC certification portal [14]
- Vendor: ES&S AWS bucket leaks 1.8 million records [13]
- Campaign: Deep Root Analytics stored 1.1 TB of voter information on an unsecured server [9]
 - Over 200 million records



Homographic Attacks

- Using alternative character sets to typosquat
- Instead of creating our own tool, let's try what's out there:
 DNStwist and EvilURL
- Focused on election portals
- Found new and interesting typosquats, but no homographic domains

COww.donaldjtrump.com www.donaldjtrump.com www.donaldjtrump.com

t@RadioHead:~/dnstwist\$./dnstwist.py www.donaldjtrump.com

/=1-=/=1_+/ / ////=1_-

	90%
.com	104.16.34.178 2400:cb00:2048:1::6810:22b2
a.com	
b.com	-
c.com	
d.com	
e.com	-
f.com	
g.com	
h.com	-
i.com	-
j.com	
k.com	
l.com	-
m.com	
n.com	
o.com	-
p.com	72.52.4.119 NS:nsl.sedoparking.com MX:localhost.mx.*
g.com	
r.com	
s.com	184.168.221.32 NS:ns77.domaincontrol.com
t.com	
	Com .com





Ron Barber CONGRESS

Ron Barber is running for Congress because he is more interested in keeping his job than making sure there are jobs for you and your family.

Barber will say just about anything to get elected – even if that means just going along with what Washington special interests tell him to do.

How out-of-touch is Ron Barber?

- Barber voted against a balanced budget that bans taxpayer-funded first class travel for Members of Congress (Roll Call #88, 3/20/13)
- Barber voted against constructing the Keystone Pipeline (Roll Call #179, 3/22/13)
- Barber voted to allow student loan interest rates to increase (Roll Call#183, 5/23/13)
- Barber even voted against work requirements for food stamps requirements passed under Democratic President Clinton. (Roll Call #476, 9/19/2013)

DONATE

Ead up with Pop Parbor? Sign up Today

www.ronbarber2014.com

Predicting Election Outcomes

- Discovered on accident
- The number of hits ElectionBuster returns for a given candidate is often *correlated* with who wins the race
- ElectionBuster hits are sometimes equal with candidates, which means a toss up
- Correlation != causation
- Likely even talking about this will change it
- Let's cherry pick some examples!





• Newman: 48.8%

[1] Illinois Primary Election Results, New York Times, 2018.

Hits Per Candidate over 2016





 Feb 7
 Mar 6
 Apr 3
 May 1
 May 29
 Jun 26
 Jul 24
 Aug 21
 Sep 18
 Oct 16
 Nov 13
 Dec 11

Congress on Lets Encrypt & HSTS



Letsencrypt





Voter Reg TLS Implementations

 TLS 1.0
 TLS 1.1
 TLS 1.2
 TLS 1.3



Election Site TLS Implementations

TLS 1.0 TLS 1.1 TLS 1.2 TLS 1.3



Election Site HSTS Use





Vendor TLS Implementations

TLS 1.0

TLS 1.1

TLS 1.2

TLS 1.3



Vendor HSTS Use





Recommendations to Companies

- Advise your clients on cybersecurity issues
- Purchase common domains
- Maintain a trusted certificate, consider extended validation (EV) certificate
- Use TLS 1.2+, strong cipher suites
- Use HSTS, get on the pre-load list
- Request assistance from EI-ISAC, DHS, FBI and other organizations

